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ABSTRACT
Copy sensitive graphical codes are used as anti-counterfeiting solu-
tion in packaging and document protection. Their security is funded
on a design hard-to-predict after print and scan. In practice there
exist different designs. Here random codes printed at the printer
resolution are considered. We suggest an estimation of such codes
by using neural networks, an in-trend approach which has however
not been studied yet in the present context. In this paper, we test a
state-of-the-art architecture efficient in the binarization of hand-
written characters. The results show that such an approach can be
successfully used by an attacker to provide a valid counterfeited
code so fool an authentication system.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security andprivacy→Authentication; •Computingmethod-
ologies→ Neural networks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Counterfeits is one of the main problems of these days. The num-
ber of counterfeited products (luxury goods, medicines, tickets,
administrative documents) is predicted to increase three percent
each year according to the association for packaging and process-
ing technology. A big amount of security techniques exists such
as hashing techniques, watermarking techniques, holograms and
security printing techniques. However, most of these solutions are
expensive in production or cannot be efficiently verified by non-
specialists without specific devices.
The development of security elements that are based on the use
of Measurable But Not Duplicable (MBND) characteristics [9] that
are formed during a production process, is a promising path for
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hardcopy document/packaging authentication. MBND can be phys-
ical characteristics (see for instance [18, 27]), or some features of
the printing process based either on the printer signature profile
[1, 16, 19] or on the use of Copy-Sensitive Graphical Codes (CSGC)
[14, 15, 24]. These security elements which are cheap and easy to
integrate, offers a user-friendly verification, compatible with stan-
dard devices for both production and verification. That is why they
correspond to some commercial solutions for packaging protection.
Nevertheless, the security aspects of these elements are not fully
studied. The security of CSGC is based on the stochastic nature
of Print-and-Scan (P&S) process. It can be easily shown that ev-
ery time when an image is printed and scanned some information
is lost in comparison with its digital version. This effect is called
the information loss principle [14]. Additionally, each printer and
scanner has its own signature [21]. Using these two properties, the
authentication test can distinguish the original CSGC (printed once)
from copied/counterfeited (printed several times).
In this paper, we focus on the unclonability of CSGC and especially
on the estimation attack of such codes using a neural approach. We
use some random binary codes for our experiments. We show that
a small amount of samples can be efficiently exploited in order to
estimate the original structure of the digital CSGC.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The authentication
system is introduced in Section 2. We discuss possible attacks in
Section 3. The decoding process using a neural network is depicted
in Section 4. The description of constructed database and the exper-
iments are presented in Section 5. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2 AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM
The authentication system using CSGC is illustrated in Fig. 1. The
authority center creates the valuable document, puts the generated
CSGC into this document and prints it using the dedicated printer.
Figure 1: Considered authentication system using CSGC.
During the verification process, the document is scanned and the
respective authentication test is applied to verify the authenticity.
The generated CSGC is a binary black-and-white image (let call
it I ), after being printed and scanned this CSGC is a grayscale
image (I˜ = I + NPS , where NPS is a noise added by P&S process).
An example of original (a black-and-white image) CSGC and its
degraded (a grayscale image) CSGC versions are illustrated in Fig. 2.
The authentication test can be performed as 1) a comparison of the
binary CSGC I with an estimated binary code, here denoted as Iˆ
(that is obtained by binarization of grayscale image I˜ during the
authentication test) or as 2) a comparison of binary CSGC I with
its degraded (graylevel) version I˜ . It was shown theoretically [13]
that the second strategy is more efficient. The authors in [20] have
tested two authentication strategies: i) using Hamming distance
between binary original CSGC and binarized versions of printed
CSGC, ii) using Pearson correlation between binary original CSGC
and graylevel printed CSGC. Nevertheless, the results of ROC curves
illustrate that both authentication strategies show the similar results
in term of CSGC clonability. Therefore, the comparison of two
binary images can give an idea about the attack efficiency.
(a) (b)
Figure 2: Example of a) an original numeric CSGC before
printing (I ) and b) its degraded version by P&S version (I˜ ).
In general the authentication test can be formulated as a hypothesis
test:
H0 : d(I ; Iˆ ) ≤ ϵ ;
H1 : d(I ; Iˆ ) > ϵ,
where d is a comparison function (for example, a distance between
two images), ϵ is the distortion threshold that was calculated in
advance by the authority center.
Most of the attacks are produced between printing and scanning
processes. An opponent needs to correctly predict I ′ - a binarized
version of CSGC I˜ that then will be re-printed and re-scanned using
the same devices (in the case of the worst type attack) and the
authentication test will process a grayscale counterfeited image I˜ ′.
The comparison function d might be sensitive to distortions added
during Print-and-Scan (P&S) process and must correctly discrimi-
nate CSGC printed ones and CSGC printed twice or counterfeited.
3 POSSIBLE ATTACKS
For counterfeiting, the opponent wants to create copies of CSGC
codes as close as possible to original. For this the opponent can use
different strategies depending on his/her practical skills. In this sec-
tion, we discuss about tools that can be used to create counterfeited
CSGC codes.
3.1 Uncontrolled duplication
The first most simple way to copy a document is the use of a copy
machine or two consecutive P&S operations. However, when we
use a copy machine we cannot control the image processing that is
applied to the document during the copying process. This attack
was explained and experimented in [24, 25]. Instead of using a copy
machine, the attack can be performed by the use of a scanner and a
printer (the same that were used for the original production in the
worst case). In this case, the attack consists of two consecutive P&S
operations. This attack can be performed by naive attacker and in-
tuitively will have the same results as the unauthorized duplication
using copy machine.
3.2 Smart attack
Here we suppose that the opponent have not only the same repro-
duction devices but also have several knowledge of image process-
ing and experience in graphics tools. This attack consists also of
two consecutive P&S operations, but in this case some basic image
processing algorithms are applied between the two P&S operations.
The opponent can perform histogram equalization or application of
sharpen enhancement of printed and scanned CSGC. These basic
image processing techniques can improve the quality of CSGC, but
the naive use of image processing techniques [23] cannot help to
create good quality counterfeits and thus cannot fool the authenti-
cation test.
The authors in [7] propose the so-called "smart" attack: (a) an at-
tacker may try to estimate the original CDP pixels utilizing inverse
print-and-scanmodel; (b) then, s/he can generate genuine-like CDPs
and copy CDP protected documents safely. In most experiments the
CDP samples resist to such attacks. However, it was shown [2] that
an attacker can produce a fake that successfully fools the detector
with reasonable number of genuine goods.
This authentication problem can be presented as an optimization
game between the legitimate source and an attacker where each
player tries to select the best P&S channel to minimize/maximize his
authentication performance [11]. For P&S process simulation the
lognormal and general Gaussian additive processes [3] are used. The
conclusions after studying this minimax game [13]: the opponent
optimal parameters are close to the legitimate source parameters
for both distribution families and the legitimate source can find a
configuration which maximizes its authentication performance.
3.3 Data driven based approach
We can at the end imagine the situation, when an attacker uses
devices (printer and scanner) from the same brand and constructs
his/her own database of some printed-and-scanned codes as well as
of their digital versions. In this case, s/he can estimate the structure
of a printed CSGC by using some binarization methods. The use
of some classical binarization methods does not give good results
and the counterfeited codes cannot pass the authentication test
[22]. Authors in [6] suggest to extract some statistics from the
printed-and-scanned images then use 5 images in order to train
some basic classifiers as LDA, SVM, QDA and naive Bayes. They
showed that the use of supervised classification can significantly
increase the quality of estimated (counterfeited) codes and the
suggested authentication system will be affected by this attack.
Figure 3: Binarization of CSGC using SAE architecture.
A deep neural network architecture (DNN) has been used in the
very recently published paper [20]. In the present paper, we have
adopted another type of neural architecture, an autoencoder, in the
goal to retrieve a (graphical) code so far decoding CSGC, to study
the same authentication system as in [6].
4 EFFICIENT LEARNING FOR DECODING
Auto-encoders are a type of feed-forward neural network which
is trained to reconstruct the input as its output. The network has
basically two parts: an encoder that learns an encoding function f
and a decoder that learns the decoding function д. It has a hidden
layer h that provides a useful compressed representation of the
input which has been very useful in learning features and for di-
mensionality reduction [26]. The network basically takes an input
x and minimizes the loss function L(x ,д(f (x))).
In order to estimate the original code we make use of an existing
auto-encoder based architecture called Selectional Auto-Encoder
(SAE) [5]. This SAE has previously been used in binarization of
document image [5] and has shown significant results. SAE are
fully convolutional network without any fully connected layers.
It consists of 5 layers of encoder and 5 layers of decoder. The hi-
erarchy of layers in the encoder part of SAE consists of series of
convolution and down-sampling operations till the hidden layer
h, whereas in the decoder part it consists in series of convolution
and up-sampling operations till reconstruction of the image to its
original size (see an illustration in Fig. 3).
In a binarization context, SAE is trained to output a selectional
value for each pixel from an input image to decide whether that
pixel belongs to foreground (black) or background (white). Since
SAE performs an image to image processing the classification of
each pixel is not computed independently, but also considering the
neighbourhood pixels.
The network topology for SAE itself is based on a deep residual
Encoder-Decoder Network (RED-Net) [12], which additionally con-
sists of residual connection from its down-sampling layer to its
corresponding up-sampling layer. Through these residual connec-
tions feature maps learned in the encoding layer are passed to its
corresponding decoding layer which helps to recover better clean
image through up-sampling. Residual connections have proven to
be very effective and lead to better results while training deeper
networks [10]. Here, down-sampling is performed by convolution,
and up-sampling is achieved using de-convolution. In addition,
batch normalization followed by Relu activation is added after each
convolution and de-convolution layers. The input and output win-
dows of the network were set to 256 × 256 and size of kernel for
convolution and de-convolution was set to 5 × 5. For all layers 64
feature maps were used. The weights of network were initialized
using Xavier uniform initializer [8] while training the network from
scratch, otherwise the weights were initialized after pre-training
on DIBCO database [17]. The learning procedure was carried out
using ways of stochastic gradient descent [4] with learning rate
of 0.001. The training of the model was done on a GeForce GTX
1080 card for 200 epochs, setting the batch size to 10. However, an
early stopping strategy is applied if their is no decrements in the
loss after 20 epochs.
Training a SAE consists of providing the input images and its cor-
responding binary ground-truth of the same size. According to the
input size of the network, each image is cropped into several non-
overlapping chunks of size 256×256. Once SAE has been completely
trained an image can be parsed through the network to obtain its
binary version. The output chunks are then recombined to form
the full image. This output is of the same size as the input image
with restricted value in the range [0,1]. This is due to the use of
sigmoid activation in the last layer of the network. After this step a
global threshold is still required to obtain the binary values. The
pixels whose selectional values are more than the global threshold
are labeled as white otherwise as black. It has been shown that the
choice of this global threshold does not impact the performance[5].
We have used this implementation from [5] which is available in
GitHub 1.
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section we describe our experiments and discuss the results
that we obtained for some decoding methods presented in [6] and
the decoding method using the SAE presented in Section 4.
5.1 Database description
In our database2, we have 100 random binary images with size of
100 × 100 dots with 48 − 52% of black dots. The real size of printed-
and-scanned codes is 4 × 4 mm. We used a laser printer Xerox
Phaser 6500 that has a true 600 dpi (dots per inch) resolution. The
printing process was done dot per dot. For acquisition we used a
high resolution scanner Epson Perfection V850 Pro with its highest
1https://github.com/ajgallego/document-image-binarization
2The constructed database is publicly available: www.univ-st-etienne.fr/
graphical-code-estimation.
resolution 9600 spi (samples per inch).
The binary images were set in 600 ppi (pixels per inch), the grayscale
images had size of 1600×1600 pixels after being printed and scanned
with the defined resolutions. So one dot of the image is represented
by a square of 16 × 16 pixels.
We assume in this paper that the authority/authentication center
and an opponent have the same printer and scanner. It is the worst
case attack, as only the decoding can influence to authentication,
but the physical process is the same.
We divide our database into train and test bases. The train and
validation database consists of 60 images, the test database consists
of 40 images. Depending on the method, the number of samples
used for training step changes, nevertheless, the number of test
images will be kept the same all the time. We have varied the size
of the training database from 60 images to 1 image. We used data
augmentation by rotating the images to 90/180/270 degrees and by
dividing each of them into four parts. That is why each image is
represented by 13 images in the data augmentation setup. The sizes
of train databases are presented in Table 2.
5.2 Estimation results
First of all, we implement and test the decoding methods proposed
in [6]. The authors mentioned that the best results were obtained
with features based on moments (F3 feature set) and with LDA
(Linear Discriminant Analysis) classifier. That is why we tested
our database only with LDA classifier, but we used all proposed
feature vectors (F1-F5). The train base contains of 5 images (as in
the reference paper), and we tested these decoding methods on 40
images of our test database. The results are illustrated in Table 1.
Decoding method BER Std Best case Worst case
LDA
F1 17.14% 0.92% 15.57% 18.86%
F2 16.72% 0.97% 14.75% 18.64%
F3 14.70% 0.82% 12.97% 16.60%
F4 16.07% 0.99% 14.31% 17.78%
F5 16.72% 0.97% 14.75% 18.64%
Table 1: Mean Bit Error Rate comparison for feature sets
from [6]. The training sets consist of 5 images.
We compare the 100 × 100 decoded CSGC with 100 × 100 digital
codes and calculate the Bit Error Rate (BER) for each pair. According
to our results the feature set F3 gives the best decoding results with
mean BER equal to 14.70%.
Then, we have tested the proposed decoding method based on auto-
encoders. To down-sample the parsed 1600 × 1600 binary output
images obtained from our auto-encoders, we apply themajority vote
strategy at each 16× 16module of the output binary image in order
to consider it as black or a white pixel. The neural network methods
are known to be efficient while the database is huge. Nevertheless,
in this paper, we would like to find the minimal number of samples
that can produce good estimation results. That is why we have
tested our approach with 1 − 60 images. In the same time, as our
images are in high resolution, we obtain a quite big number of
patches (see Table 2), that is enough to train our SAE.
The results obtained using different size of trained database are
presented in Table 3. We note that the better binarization results
Number of patches
Nb of images used Train database Train Validation
60 im w/augm. 780 images 14410 50
60 im 60 images 2890 50
5 im w/augm. 65 images 1205 98
5 im 5 images 245 98
1 im w/augm. 13 images 241 98
Table 2: Sizes of trained data sets.
are obtained when we have bigger training database. The BER is
8.75%, when we use 60 images with data augmentation for training.
Nevertheless, the binarization results obtained using 1 image with
data augmentation are close to the results obtained using 5 images
with data augmentation. The BER is 13.38%, when we use 1 image
with data augmentation for training, and it is 12.41%, when we use
5 images with data augmentation for training. That means that the
high decoding results can be obtained even with one CSGC image
in training data base.
Nb of images used BER Std Best case Worst case
60 im w/augm. 8.75% 0.67% 7.49% 10.96%
60 im 9.86% 0.87% 8.32% 12.25%
5 im w/augm. 12.41% 0.99% 10.34% 14.70%
5 im 12.91% 0.95 11.23% 15.03%
1 im w/augm. 13.38% 0.93% 11.52% 15.57%
Table 3: Mean Bit Error Rate comparison for auto-encoder
binarization with different size of train base.
Whenwe compare the results from Table 1 and Table 3, we note that
the decoding with auto-encoder approach gives better results. We
increase the decoding rate in average up to 91.25%. With classical
thresholding the decoding rate is in average 65.35% and while using
the decoding with feature set F3 and LDA, the decoding rate is in
average 85.30%. That is why the use of neural network approaches
can significantly increase the decoding rate of CSGC after P&S
process.
5.3 Authentication test
In this section, we aim at study an impact of this estimation attack
on the authentication test. The attack is as follows. An attacker
scans the printed CSGC using the same scanner (as authentication
center) and decodes the printed and scanned CSGC using either
one of the tested classification methods (LDA with feature set F1
and F3) with 5 images in training base or an auto-encoder with
1− 60 images in training base. Then, s/he prints these counterfeited
CSGC using the same printer.
The authentication center verify the authenticity of CSGC by:
(1) decoding the printed CSGC using:
• classical thresholding with threshold th = 127,
• Otsu binarization method,
(2) calculating the difference between the decoded CSGC and
an original CSGC,
(3) comparing the obtained distance d with pre-calculated au-
thentication threshold ϵ .
We use the BER as authentication test as it is easy to implement
and it can give us an idea about the efficiency of our attack and
estimation accuracy as was explained in Section 2.
The results of our decoding processes are presented in Table 4. We
note that the best results are obtained for CSGC counterfeited using
auto-encoder approach. The difference between the original and
these counterfeited codes using thesholding and Otsu binarization
for authentication is in average 3.05% and 2.78%, respectively.
Printed CSGC BER Std
Original Iˆ127 34.65% 1.36%
Iˆotsu 26.51% 1.01%
Attack
th = 127
Iˆ ′ 43.92% 1.09%
Iˆ ′F 1 40.18% 1.21%
Iˆ ′F 3 39.69% 1.05%
Iˆ ′60auд 37.10% 1.11%
Iˆ ′60 37.10% 1.22%
Iˆ ′5auд 37.41% 1.36%
Iˆ ′5 37.13% 1.33%
Iˆ ′1auд 37.05% 1.33%
Otsu
Iˆ ′ 35.14% 0.91%
Iˆ ′F 1 35.32% 0.75%
Iˆ ′F 3 34.41% 0.67%
Iˆ ′60auд 29.29% 0.81%
Iˆ ′60 29.65% 0.86%
Iˆ ′5auд 30.46% 0.93%
Iˆ ′5 30.75% 0.83%
Iˆ ′1auд 30.72% 0.94%
Table 4: Mean Bit Error Rate obtained while applying a clas-
sical thresholding with th = 127 and an Otsu’s binarization
for authentication test.
We plot the Receiver Operation Characteristics (ROC) curves for
authentication using classical thresholding and Otsu’s binarization
in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, respectively. By varying the authentication
threshold ϵ , we compute the number of original (first print) and
counterfeited (second print) codes that pass the authentication test.
The percentage of accepted and rejected codes per attack are pre-
sented in Table 5. From this table we can conclude that if the op-
ponent estimates the CSGC using classical thresholding, the coun-
terfeited codes will not pass the authentication test. Let set the
authentication threshold ϵ = 37.5. With this authentication thresh-
old ϵ all 100% original codes pass the authentication test. With the
classification strategy using LDA with F3 feature set 5% of coun-
terfeited codes can pass this authentication test. The results using
auto-encoder approach are better: while using 60 images with data
augmentation, 55% of codes can pass the authentication test. While
using 1 images with data augmentation, 62.5% of codes can pass
the authentication test with the same authentication threshold ϵ .
We suppose that it is due to global binarization using the same
threshold which is not adapted to this kind of images.
For authentication decoding usingOtsu binarization, we have slightly
different results as this binarizatoion threshold is adapted for each
image.. The number of accepted and rejected codes per attack are
Figure 4: ROC curve for LDA with F3 characteristics vector
and all auto-encoder decoding for authentication test that
use th = 127 for CSGC decoding.
presented in Table 5. If we chose the authentication threshold equal
to ϵ = 28.5, all 100% of original codes can pass the authentication
test, but also 17.5% of counterfeited codes using auto-encoder ap-
proach while using 60 images with data augmentation for training
pass the authentication test. In comparison, there is no any image
counterfeited using Otsu binarization or classification strategy us-
ing LDA with F3 feature set which can pass the authentication test
with this ϵ .
Figure 5: ROC curve for LDA with F3 characteristics vector
and all auto-encoder decoding for authentication test that
uses Otsu binarization for CSGC decoding.
The obtained results show us that the use of decoding techniques
based on auto-encoders can help an attacker to create the counter-
feited CSGC that will fool the authentication test.
Original Attack
same as Auto-encoder
authentication LDA+F3 1 image w/aug 60 images w/aug
A R A R A R A R A R
Authentication using tresholding with th = 127
ϵ = 34.5 45% 55% 0% 100% 0% 100% 2.5% 97.5% 0% 100%
ϵ = 35.5 70% 30% 0% 100% 0% 100% 12.5% 87.5% 12.5% 87.5%
ϵ = 36.5 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 35% 65% 20% 80%
ϵ = 37.5 100% 0% 0% 100% 5% 95% 62.5% 37.5% 55% 45%
Authentication using Otsu’s binarization
ϵ = 26.5 55% 45% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100%
ϵ = 27.5 90% 10% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 2.5% 97.5%
ϵ = 28.5 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 17.5% 82.5%
ϵ = 29.5 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 7.5% 92.5% 52.5% 47.5%
Table 5: The percentage of accepted (A) and rejected (R) codes depending on authentication threshold ϵ for authentication
using classical thresholding with th = 127 and using Otsu’s binarization
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we achieve a more efficient estimation attack using
a supervised approach based on neural networks, here an auto-
encoder. We obtain high decoding results while using quite small
database (especially for neural network approaches). By training
our neural network with 60 images of printed-and-scanned copy
sensitive graphical code we obtain less then 10% as bit error rate.
In future, we want to propose smarter authentication test and to
test the proposed attacks with this smart authentication. The more
realistic attacks need to be studied also. For example, the case
when an attacker do not have the same printer-scanner as the
authority center. In this case, an attacker needs to predict an impact
of authentic P&S process.
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